Natural selection is often regarded as a result of severe competition. Defect seems beneficial for a single individual in many cases. However, cooperation is observed in many levels of biological systems ranging from single cells to animals, including human society. We have yet known that in unstructured populations, evolution favors defectors over cooperators. On the other hand, there have been much interest on evolutionary games 1, 2 on structured population and on graphs [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] There are only two kinds of agent: cooperator and defector. A cooperator pays a cost, c, for each neighbor to receive a benefit, b. On the other hand, a defector pays no cost and its neighbor does not receive any benefit. We also assume b > c. The payoff of the game can be described by the following payoff matrix
network theory is that results depend not only on itself but also on others'. In evolutionary games on network, we find the same characteristic.
There are only two kinds of agent: cooperator and defector. A cooperator pays a cost, c, for each neighbor to receive a benefit, b. On the other hand, a defector pays no cost and its neighbor does not receive any benefit. We also assume b > c. The payoff of the game can be described by the following payoff matrix 
In deterministic game, D-D is the unique Nash equilibrium and will be taken. Although cooperation by all the agents raises payoff of them, it is difficult to maintain cooperation because for a single agent defect is always beneficial than cooperation. Thus cooperation will collapse. In an unstructured population, where all the agents interact each other, defectors tend to have higher average gain than cooperators, so that cooperators would extinct as a result of natural selection. This is true for deterministic replicator equation 21, 22 and stochastic game of finite population 23 . In the model of present paper, a network structure is introduced. Agent occupies each vertex of the network. They play games only with the agents on adjacent vertices. If there are l neighbors around the cooperator regardless of cooperators or defectors, he pays cost, lc. In addition, if j of them are cooperators he is benefited jb from the cooperators. His fitness from the game is jb − lc. If the defector has i cooperators around him, his fitness is ib. The game proceeds as follows. For each time step, randomly chosen one agent on the network dies. Then adjacent agents compete for the 2 empty vertex proportional to their fitness. The fitness of each agent is given by the constant term, baseline fitness, plus the payoff of the game. When the payoff of the game is relatively smaller than the baseline fitness, we call this as weak selection. The idea of the weak selection is that there are many factors determining the whole fitness, the game in consideration is only one of the factors.
Reproduction of strategy can be taken as generic and cultural. The former is biological selection, the latter is social phenomena.
The interest of the present paper comes from evolutionary biology and complex networks.
We need to explain a few things about complex networks. Degree, k, is the number of edges the vertex has. If all the vertices have the same degree, the network is called regular network. If not, it is called non-regular network. k is the mean degree. k nn = k 2 / k is the nearest neighbor mean degree. For instance, if you choose one vertex randomly, the mean degree of which is k .
If you look at vertices linked to the randomly chosen one, the mean degree of which is not k but k nn . The fact that k = k nn plays an important role in complex network theory. In our point of view many interesting results 24, 25 comes from k = k nn . The intuitive reason why they differ is that vertices are likely to be linked to the vertices with larger degree. We need to explain in what respect we can say a network favors cooperation. First we prepare a network where all the vertices are occupied by only defectors, then we replace one of them by a single cooperator, then we start the evolutionary games until either when all the vertices are occupied by only defectors or only cooperators. We iterate the same games and have the probability that only cooperators occupy the vertices. This probability is called fixation probability. If selection neither favors nor opposes cooperation the probability is 1/N , N is the size of networks. If the fixation probability is larger than 1/N , we say that the network structure favors cooperation. Thus the condition b/c > k nn is like a threshold between network favors cooperation or opposes.
We derive the condition by mean field approximation. Mean field approximation is an useful method which replaces something by mean value to obtain analytical solution, which has been used especially in Physics. In mean field picture, a vertex is surrounded by the vertices with degree k nn as illustrated in Fig.2 . First we need to examine what happens on the vertex with k nn . In mean field picture, as a vertex is surrounded by vertices k nn , so the vertex k nn is surrounded by the vertices k nn , which is illustrated in Fig.2 and called k nn network hereafter. Next, we study the fixation problem on the k nn network. The point is that this network is regular network with degree k nn . We are able to use the results of previous studies 11, 12 , that is, on regular network with degree k the condition of favoring cooperation is b/c > k. Thus, on k nn network the condition is b/c > k nn . It is necessary for the whole network to be fixed that at least k nn network is fixed.
Unless k nn is fixed, the whole network is not fixed either. Thus that is the necessary condition.
However, we will see that it is not only necessary condition but also sufficient condition in mean field picture. What happens if k nn network is fixed? Remind the rule of the game, for each time step one vertex is randomly chosen to die and the adjacent vertices compete for the empty vertex proportional to their fitness. In mean field picture, any chosen vertex is surrounded by the vertices with degree k nn . Because we assume that k nn is already fixed, any vertex surrounding randomly chosen vertex is a cooperator. Since the empty site will be taken by the adjacent players and all of them are cooperators yet, the agent on the site has no choice but to be a cooperator. As we have seen, we only have to study the fixation problem on the k nn network in our mean field Here is the conclusion. We derive the condition of favoring cooperation on networks. Although it has been believed that b/c > k is the condition, we show that b/c > k nn is the one.
We also show that among three kinds of network: regular network, random network and scale free network, regular network favors cooperation most and scale free network least. On scale free network with infinite number of vertices and 2 < γ ≤ 3 cooperation is unfeasible. 
